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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal marks the second time this litigation has 
come before this court. It arises out of a bankruptcy 
proceeding that began when Chemetron Corporationfiled a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
in early 1988. The bankruptcy court confirmed 
Chemetron's bankruptcy reorganization plan on July 12, 
1990. On March 2, 1992, Phyllis Jaskey Jones and 
fourteen other persons filed a state law tort action in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio ("the 
Cleveland Action") seeking monetary damages and other 
relief for injuries allegedly sustained from exposure to 
radioactive and other toxic and hazardous substances 
Chemetron deposited at the Bert Avenue dump, a site 
located in their residential neighborhood of Newburgh 
Heights, Ohio. The suit was later amended to name a total 
of twenty-one plaintiffs. Chemetron moved to dismiss that 
action on the ground that the bankruptcy court had 
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retained jurisdiction over the issues presented when it 
confirmed the reorganization plan. 
 
The parties agreed to stay the Cleveland Action, and the 
plaintiffs filed a motion in the bankruptcy court to allow 
their late-filed claims, or alternatively for an adversarial 
proceeding to determine that their claims had not been 
discharged by the bankruptcy confirmation order. At the 
time they filed their motion, the plaintiffs were scattered 
across Ohio and as far away as Texas. In support of their 
motion to permit late-filing, the plaintiffs argued that they 
had not been provided with sufficient notice of the 
bankruptcy proceeding, and that they were unaware that 
their illnesses were the result of Chemetron's conduct at 
the time Chemetron filed for bankruptcy. In support of their 
request for a determination of nondischargeability, the 
plaintiffs contended that their claims had accrued after the 
confirmation of Chemetron's bankruptcy reorganization 
plan. 
 
The bankruptcy court agreed that the plaintiffs had 
received inadequate notice, and permitted the latefiling. In 
re Allegheny Int'l, Inc. (Jones v. Chemetron Corp.), 158 B.R. 
356 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993). The United States District 
Court reversed. 170 B.R. 83 (W.D. Pa. 1994). The appeal 
came to this court, which ruled that the plaintiffs had 
received sufficient notice of the bankruptcy proceeding. We 
remanded to the bankruptcy court, however, to determine 
whether the plaintiffs should still be permitted tofile their 
claims based on excusable neglect pursuant to Bankruptcy 
Rule 9006(1). Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341 (3d 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1137 (1996) [hereinafter 
Chemetron I]. 
 
On remand, the bankruptcy court held, by opinion and 
order dated September 14, 1998, that the plaintiffs had 
failed to demonstrate excusable neglect. Turning to their 
motion for an adversarial proceeding, the court held that 
the plaintiffs' claims had accrued prior to the bar date and 
to the 1990 confirmation of Chemetron's reorganization 
plan; they therefore were discharged by the court's 
confirmation order. The district court affirmed by 
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memorandum opinion dated May 18, 1999. This timely 




The underlying facts are set forth in this court's prior 
opinion in this case, and need only be summarized here. 
Beginning in 1965, appellee Chemetron Corporation 
("Chemetron") owned and operated a manufacturing facility 
on Harvard Avenue in Cuyahoga Heights, Ohio, as well as 
a nearby landfill on Bert Avenue in Newburgh Heights, 
Ohio. From 1965 to 1972, Chemetron employed a 
manufacturing process at the Harvard Avenue facility that 
utilized depleted uranium. After Chemetron ceased to use 
this process, it demolished a portion of its Harvard Avenue 
facility and placed a quantity of rubble from the demolition 
in the Bert Avenue landfill.2 This rubble was apparently 
contaminated due to radiation exposure. 
 
Between 1980 and 1988, Chemetron was involved in 
periodic clean-up efforts at both the Harvard Avenue and 
Bert Avenue sites at the direction of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission ("NRC"), with some involvement by the federal 
and Ohio Environmental Protection Agencies. The presence 
of hazardous materials at the Bert Avenue dump and these 
efforts to clean up the area received considerable local 
attention beginning shortly after its discovery in 1980. The 
local press reported on these cleanup efforts for the next 
decade. Town meetings were held in which environmental 
officials explained the situation to area residents. A 
community watchdog group formed that distributed a 
questionnaire to everyone in the neighborhood requesting 
information about contact with the dump and medical 
conditions suffered. The mayor's office sent out a newsletter 
in 1980 noting concern about the contamination. As early 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 157. The district court had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 158(a). This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 158(d). 
 
2. Later in 1975, Chemetron sold both sites to McGean Chemical 
Company. McGean Chemical Co. subsequently merged with Rohco, Inc., 
to become McGean-Rohco, Inc., the current owner of both sites. 
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as 1980, another resident in the area filed a lawsuit against 
Chemetron charging that the presence of hazardous 
materials at the Bert Avenue dump was responsible for her 
daughter's health problems. 
 
For the next decade, cleanup efforts persisted, but as this 
court noted in its earlier decision in this case, these efforts 
were of "dubious" efficacy. Chemetron I , 72 F.3d at 344. By 
1990, local attention swelled again, recognizing that the 
contamination danger persisted. Although press accounts 
were at times ambiguous concerning the severity of the 
danger presented by the Bert Avenue dump, some articles 
reported that several families in the neighborhood were 
suffering adverse health effects. 
 
On February 20, 1988, Chemetron filed a petition for 
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Following Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3), the bankruptcy 
court issued a bar date order, fixing the claims bar date at 
May 31, 1988. Under bankruptcy law, the bar date is the 
last day on which existing claims can be filed against the 
debtor. The bar date order required that actual notice be 
provided to all persons known to have claims against the 
debtors. The order required notice to all other claimants by 
publication in the national editions of the New York Times 
and Wall Street Journal. Chemetron complied with the 
order and, in addition, voluntarily published notice in seven 
other newspapers in areas where it was doing business at 
the time of the filing. On July 12, 1990, the bankruptcy 
court confirmed Chemetron's reorganization plan. 
 
Nevertheless, Jones and the other plaintiffs assert in 
affidavits that they were unaware of the degree of risk 
posed to their health and safety by the contaminated site 
until after reading about a 1991 federal lawsuitfiled 
against Chemetron in Cleveland by other local residents. 
Only then, the plaintiffs assert, did they contact lawyers, 
who proceeded to gather their medical records, have these 
records analyzed by physicians, and subsequently report to 
the plaintiffs that their health problems resulted from the 
contamination. 
 
In March 1992, almost four years after the claims bar 
date and twelve years after the first newspaper articles 
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reported on contamination at the sites, Phyllis Jones and 
ultimately twenty other individuals brought suit against 
Chemetron, McGean Chemical Co., and McGean-Rohco, 
Inc., in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, 
Ohio. The gravamen of the complaint alleged injury from 
exposure to toxic chemicals as a result of time spent living 
in or visiting the Bert Avenue area. 
 
Of the twenty-one plaintiffs, one, Ivan Schaffer, was born 
on August 27, 1992, more than two years after the 





We first discuss the plaintiffs' claim that the bankruptcy 
court erred in concluding that they failed to demonstrate 
excusable neglect. Next, we address their argument that the 
bankruptcy court erred in finding that their claims arose 
prior to the confirmation of Chemetron's bankruptcy 
reorganization plan. Finally, we revisit the issue of notice 




On remand from this court's decision in Chemetron I, the 
plaintiffs argued that the bankruptcy court should permit 
them to file their claims late because their failure to file 
prior to the May 31, 1998 bar date was attributable to 
excusable neglect.3 The district court affirmed the 
bankruptcy court's ruling that the plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate excusable neglect under the test enunciated in 
Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates 
Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). 4 It 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1) provides: 
 
       [W]hen an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
       specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or 
by 
       order of court, the court for cause shown may at any time in its 
       discretion . . . on motion made after the expiration of the 
specified 
       period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
       result of excusable neglect. 
 
4. Under this test, to show "excusable neglect" sufficient to waive the 
requirement that all bankruptcy claims be filed by the bar date, a 
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concluded that to allow the plaintiffs to proceed with claims 
potentially amounting to $36 million four years after 
Chemetron's bankruptcy petition was filed and two years 
after its reorganization plan was confirmed "would cause 
disruption to the bankruptcy process that has already 
taken place," and therefore would cause extreme prejudice 
to the debtor." (Bankr. Op. at 7). It further noted that "the 
length of delay in this case was significant," and that the 
plaintiffs did not contest this. (Bankr. Op. at 8). The court 
also concluded that there is no evidence of bad faith on the 
part of the plaintiffs. (Bankr. Op. at 15). Finally, the court 
rejected the plaintiffs' arguments (1) that Chemetron's 
prepetition actions contributed to their delay infiling their 
claim, by Chemetron's misrepresentation of the danger 
present at the Bert Avenue dump to the relevant 
government agencies and to the public (Bankr. Op. at 9); (2) 
that the investigating agencies failed to adequately 
investigate or independently follow up with Chemetron's 
clean-up efforts; and (3) that newspaper accounts 
inaccurately reported the extent of the contamination, and 
failed to warn the community that residents could suffer 
physical harm from the exposure. 
 
The bankruptcy court made the following pertinent 
findings: 
 
        [Chemetron's cleanup] efforts were not satisfactory 
       according to reports by the NRC. However, in the 
       summer and early fall of 1980, several newspaper 
       articles were published in the Cleveland Plain Dealer 
       and Cleveland Press regarding the contamination and 
       the concerns expressed by the residents of the area. 
       Specifically, articles appeared in the Cleveland Plain 
       Dealer on 7/9/80, 9/5/80, 9/10/80, 9/12/80, 
       11/21/80 and 11/21/80. The Cleveland Press also had 
       an article on July 8, 1980. In particular, one article 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
bankruptcy court must make an equitable inquiry into the totality of the 
relevant circumstances. Relevant circumstances to be considered include 
(1) the danger of prejudice to the debtor, (2) the length of the delay and 
its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the 
delay, 
including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, 
and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. Id. 
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       reported on a town meeting held in September of 1980 
       to address residents concerns about the levels of 
       radiation in the area. The article indicated that six 
       members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well 
       as approximately 80 people from the community were 
       in attendance. The residents were informed that while 
       levels of radiation were present on the Chemetron and 
       McGean properties, the levels were not high enough to 
       cause harm. 
 
        In addition to the potential dangers being reported in 
       the newspapers, members of the community organized 
       and formed the Concerned Citizens of Newburgh 
       Heights. This association prepared and distributed a 
       community health survey which stated that the citizens 
       were working to remove the danger of hazardous waste 
       from the community. 
 
        Several investigative and administrative agencies 
       were involved in the assessment and cleanup efforts in 
       conjunction with the NRC including the U.S. 
       Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the Ohio 
       Environmental Protection Agency and the Ohio Health 
       Department. A Congresswoman made inquiry and 
       follow up inquiry to the federal EPA in the fall of 1980 
       into 1981. There was awareness of the site and 
       attention focused on it by at least 1980. This level of 
       awareness and inquiry does not support plaintiffs 
       contention that misrepresentations by Chemetron 
       hindered them from learning the necessary 
       information. 
 
(Bankr. Op. at 11-12). Based on these findings, the court 
further found "that the toxic site was well known in the 
community." (Bankr. Op. at 12). 
 
Moreover, the court found that even assuming 
Chemetron did mislead or provide inadequate information 
regarding the contamination to the community, the 
plaintiffs failed to adequately investigate the situation 
themselves, a factor wholly within their control. Specifically, 
the court noted that "[n]ot one of [the plaintiffs'] affidavits 
indicates what efforts had been made through the course of 
plaintiffs' medical history to determine the cause of their 
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injuries until they learned of the class action suitfiled by 
the other residents . . . [,] despite the fact that certain 
affidavits state that the families had serious health 
problems." (Bankr. Op. at 14). Moreover, the court noted 
that "nothing in the record[ ] . . . suggest[s] that plaintiffs 
sought information from Chemetron which may have 
assisted them in their determination which was denied." 
(Bankr. Op. at 14-15). 
 
We must accept the bankruptcy court's factual 
determinations unless clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 8013. Our review of issues of pure law, or mixed 
questions of law and fact, is plenary. See Mellon Bank, N.A. 
v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 642 (3d Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 937 (1992). We review the 
bankruptcy court's ultimate determination regarding the 
existence of excusable neglect for abuse of discretion. See 
In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the bankruptcy 
court imposed an "unreasonable burden" on them because 
they had no way of knowing that they had a claim against 
Chemetron prior to the 1988 bar date, and therefore the 
delay was beyond their control. The burden of proving 
excusable neglect lies with the late-claimant. See In re 
Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 156 B.R. 928, 936 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1993), aff 'd, Civ. A. No. 93-3571, 1993 WL 534494, at *5 
(D.N.J. Dec. 13, 1993).5 Moreover, "[i]gnorance of one's own 
claim does not constitute excusable neglect." In re Best 
Prods. Co., Inc., 140 B.R. 353, 359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), 
cited with approval in In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 96 
F.3d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
We conclude that the determinations of the bankruptcy 
court that contamination generally was known in the 
community in the early 1980's, and that some residents 
publicly expressed concern about the health effects of these 
toxins in press accounts and at public meetings, are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The plaintiffs, relying on cases involving motions for summary 
judgment, suggest that the bankruptcy court should have viewed the 
facts in a light more favorable to them. This case does not involve 
summary judgment, however, and therefore the bankruptcy court 
properly placed the burden on the plaintiffs. 
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supported by the record. Moreover, as discussed in greater 
detail in Part II.B. below, the record supports the court's 
observation that the plaintiffs introduced no evidence to 
show what measures they took to specifically investigate 
the cause of their medical problems. Therefore, these 
findings are not clearly erroneous.6  
 
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court committed no abuse of 
its discretion in holding that the plaintiffs have failed to 
sustain their burden of proving excusable neglect. The 
prejudice to the "fresh start" to which Chemetron was 
entitled as a result of the Chapter 11 reorganization, the 
delay of four years after the bar date and two years after 
the confirmation date before the plaintiffs brought their 
claim, and their failure to specifically investigate the cause 
of their illnesses, even though the danger from the Bert 
Avenue dump generally was known in the community, 
combine to defeat their request that they be permitted to 




The plaintiffs also filed a motion for an adversarial 
proceeding requesting a determination by the bankruptcy 
court that even absent excusable neglect, their claims arose 
after the confirmation of Chemetron's bankruptcy 
reorganization plan. Therefore, their Cleveland Action was 
unaffected by the earlier bankruptcy proceeding. 
 
The parties dispute the correct standard for determining 
when the plaintiffs' claims arose. Chemetron contends that 
the question of when the plaintiffs' claims arose is not 
governed by state law dictating when a cause of action 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The plaintiffs make an additional argument that the bankruptcy court 
should have concluded that their failure to file claims prior to the bar 
date was excusable because they are insufficiently sophisticated to know 
that they might have claims against Chemetron. (Appellants' Br. at 31- 
32). However, the plaintiffs' degree of sophistication is an issue that is 
relevant to the adequacy of the notice of bankruptcy proceedings they 
received, In re Grand Union Co., 204 B.R. 864, 872, 880 (Bankr. D. Del. 
1997), not to the issue of excusable neglect. The adequacy of notice in 
this case was (with one exception, discussed infra at note 14) 
conclusively decided by this court in Chemetron I. 
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accrues, but rather by a federal common law of 
bankruptcy. Although significant authority supporting this 
proposition exists in other circuits, this circuit has held the 
reverse. In Matter of Frenville Co., Inc., 744 F.2d 332 (3d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985), this court 
held that in most circumstances a "claim" arises for 
bankruptcy purposes at the same time the underlying state 
law cause of action accrues. Id. at 337. We are cognizant of 
the criticism the Frenville decision has engendered,7 but it 
remains the law of this circuit. See Matter of Penn Central 
Transp. Co., 71 F.3d 1113, 1114-15 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying 
rule of Frenville), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 (1996); In re 
Bryer, 216 B.R. 755, 759 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (same). 
Accordingly, this court must look to Ohio tort law to 
determine when the plaintiffs' claims accrued. 
 
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that where an injury 
is latent, the "discovery rule" dictates that a cause of action 
based on that injury accrues, for statute of limitations 
purposes, when the injury is manifest and when the injured 
party knows or has reason to know the cause of the injury. 
Liddell v. SCA Servs. of Ohio, Inc., 635 N.E.2d 1233, 1237- 
39 (Ohio 1994); O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. , 447 N.E.2d 
727, 732 (Ohio 1983). That court, however, has never 
addressed whether knowledge of causation is required even 
where an injury is manifest, i.e., where the plaintiff is 
aware of actual physical harm. Ohio law is not particularly 
clear on this issue. 
 
Nevertheless, several Ohio courts have held that some 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See, e.g., Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Estate 
of 
Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1576 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995); Grady v. 
A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed 
sub nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co, Inc., 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); In re 
Black, 70 B.R. 645, 648-51 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986); Acevedo v. Van Dorn 
Plastic Machinery Co., 68 B.R. 495, 497-98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.1986); In re 
Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 688-90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re 
Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 701-05 & n.13 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986); In re 
Yanks, 49 B.R. 56, 57-59 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Baldwin-United 
Corp., 48 B.R. 901, 903 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); Ralph R. Mabey & 
Annette W. Jarvis, In re Frenville: A Critique by the Nat'l Bankruptcy 
Conference's Comm. on Claims & Distributions, 42 Bus. Law. 697, 703-14 
(1987). 
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knowledge of the relationship between the putative 
plaintiff 's injury and the illegal conduct responsible for that 
injury is required for a cause of action to accrue (although 
they disagree about the required degree of knowledge 
regarding how proximately the injury resulted from the 
defendant's conduct). Barker v. A.H. Robins Co. , No. 84AP- 
297, 1985 WL 9826 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 17, 1985), an 
unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals of Ohio, is 
most directly on point. There, the plaintiff brought an 
action to recover damages for an infection requiring 
removal of her left ovary, resulting from her use of 
defendant's intra-uterine device. The trial court dismissed 
the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. 
Interpreting Ohio precedent, the Court of Appeals held that 
application of the "discovery rule" in all cases of bodily 
injury requires a determination as to when the plaintiff 
knew or should have known of the "causal relationship" 
between the defendant's actions and her injuries. Id. at *5- 
6. In so holding, the court expressly rejected the notion that 
the knowledge of causation required by cases like O'Stricker 
was limited to situations in which the plaintiff 's injuries 
were latent. Id.8 
 
Apparently assuming without deciding that such a rule 
applied, the bankruptcy court found that the plaintiffs had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Ohio statutes also provide for application of the discovery rule to 
various torts. Most relevant here is Ohio Revised Code S 2305.10, which 
states: 
 
       (A) . . . [A]n action . . . for bodily injury . . . shall be 
brought within 
       two years after the cause of action accrues. Except as provided in 
       divisions (B)(1) to (4) of this section, a cause of action accrues 
under 
       this division when the injury . . . occurs. 
 
       (B)(1) For purposes of division (A) of this section, a cause of 
action 
       for bodily injury . . . that is caused by exposure to hazardous or 
       toxic chemicals . . . accrues upon the date on which the plaintiff 
is 
       informed by competent medical authority that the plaintiff has an 
       injury that is related to the exposure, or upon the date on which 
by 
       the exercise of reasonable diligence the plaintiff should have 
known 
       that the plaintiff has an injury that is related to the exposure, 
       whichever date occurs first. 
 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 2305.10 (emphasis added). 
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failed to present evidence to show that they satisfied their 
duty to investigate the cause of their manifest injuries. 
Specifically, the court noted that the record amply 
demonstrated that other residents in the Newburgh Heights 
community were aware of the existence of harmful 
substances at the Bert Avenue dump prior to 1990. (Bankr. 
Op. at 21-23). The bankruptcy court also found it 
significant that one neighborhood resident, Barbara Looby, 
had made inquiry into a connection between medical 
conditions and exposure to toxins present at the dump as 
early as 1980. (Bankr. Op. at 22). The court found that 
there was no reason 
 
       that competent medical authority was unable to make 
       the appropriate diagnosis. There is nothing to suggest 
       that the medical community at the time did not have 
       the knowledge or necessary scientific evidence to 
       determine medical conditions resulting from toxic 
       exposure. 
 
(Bankr. Op. at 22). Accordingly, the bankruptcy court 
determined that had the plaintiffs undertaken a reasonable 
investigation of the cause of their manifest injuries, they 
would have discovered this potential cause, and their 
causes of action would have arisen prior to thefiling of 
Chemetron's bankruptcy petition. Consequently, the court 
held their claims were discharged by the 1990 confirmation 
order. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the bankruptcy 
court's factual findings were clearly erroneous. Specifically, 
they contend that the court erred in finding that they failed 
to investigate the cause of their injuries. In support of this 
contention, however, the plaintiffs primarily argue that 
notwithstanding press accounts, community meetings and 
newsletters from the mayor's office, they personally were 
unaware of the danger posed by the dump. Moreover, they 
claim that Chemetron contributed to their obliviousness 
because it knew what chemicals were present at the dump, 
but lied to the community about it. 
 
As the bankruptcy court observed, the Ohio Supreme 
Court has superimposed on the "discovery rule" a 
"reasonable investigation" requirement, which essentially 
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acts to end the tolling of the statute of limitations prior to 
actual discovery of the nature and cause of a putative 
plaintiff 's injury at the time he or she should have 
discovered this information through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. See Flowers v. Walker, 589 N.E.2d 
1284, 1288-89 (Ohio 1992);9 see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
S 2305.10 (cause of action may accrue "upon the date on 
which by exercise of reasonable diligence the plaintiff 
should have known that the plaintiff has an injury that is 
related to the exposure"). Even the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of a policy requiring prospective 
plaintiffs to "initiate a prompt inquiry" regarding a 
negligence cause of action. United States v. Kubrick, 444 
U.S. 111, 118, 122 (1979) (addressing accrual of claim 
under Federal Tort Claims Act); see also Zeleznik v. United 
States, 770 F.2d 20, 22-23 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1108 (1986). Accordingly, we now turn to an analysis 
of whether the plaintiffs satisfied this diligence requirement. 
 
In their brief to this court and at oral argument, the 
plaintiffs have made reference to their repeated visits to 
their treating physicians.10 Notwithstanding these 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Flowers was a medical malpractice case, which was governed by a one 
year statute of limitations. The court noted that in Ohio, the "discovery 
rule" had been judicially imposed in determining when such actions 
accrue. Id. at 1287. The court then held that "[a] plaintiff need not have 
discovered all the relevant facts necessary to file a claim in order to 
trigger the statute of limitations. . . . Rather, the `cognizable event' 
itself 
puts the plaintiff on notice to investigate the facts and circumstances 
relevant to her claim in order to pursue her remedies." Id. at 1287-88. 
The court further held "the identity of the practitioner who committed 
the alleged malpractice is one of the facts that the plaintiff must 
investigate, and discover, once she has reason to believe that she is a 
victim of medical malpractice." Id. at 1288. There is no reason to believe 
the Ohio Supreme Court would not impose a similar diligence 
requirement in a toxic tort case such as this. See also supra note 8 
(quoting Ohio Rev. Stat. Ann. S 2305.10). 
 
10. The plaintiffs assert that the bankruptcy court "placed an 
unreasonable burden upon [them] to have greater knowledge than their 
physicians or the regulatory agencies which were involved in 
investigating the site." (Appellants' Br. at 27, 32). They contend: 
 
       [T]he Appellants in this case had no reason to question their 
       physicians about the possibility that their illnesses might have 
been 
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assertions, however, there is no evidence at all on this 
record that thirteen of the twenty-one plaintiffs even visited 
doctors to determine the cause of their medical problems. 
 
Seventeen of the plaintiffs in this case submitted 
affidavits in support of their filings in the bankruptcy court. 
Four of these affidavits imply, without stating directly, that 
the affiants had been to see doctors about their health 
problems. These affidavits include the following language: 
 
       During the process of gathering medical information 
       [for evaluation for this lawsuit], and in the normal 
       course of my continuing treatment for various medical 
       problems, I informed my treating physicians and 
       nurses of the investigations our attorneys were 
       conducting relating to the radioactive substances and 
       chemicals. While none of those physicians made any 
       statements to me as to the relationships between my 
       medical problems and these substances and chemicals, 
       they were all extremely interested. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       caused by their exposure to radiation and hazardous substances at 
       the Toxic Sites. When Appellants finally acquired the suspicion 
that 
       their illnesses were caused by such exposure, their treating 
       physicians still did not express an opinion that linked their 
illnesses 
       to the exposure. 
 
       *   *   * 
 
       The fact is -- these Appellants knew what their doctors told them, 
       and were reasonable in relying upon those statements until they 
       were told otherwise by competent medical authority. 
 
(Appellants' Br. at 42 (emphasis in original)). Finally, they state: 
 
       Even when Appellants' treating physicians were asked about a 
       connection between their exposure to Toxic Sites and their 
injuries, 
       their treating physicians did not identify a connection. 
 
       *   *   * 
 
       The Appellants in this proceeding have regularly seen physicians 
for 
       treatment of their injuries, but were never advised by their 
       physicians of a causal connection between their exposure to the 
       Toxic Sites and their illnesses. 
 
(Appellants' Br. at 47). 
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(Appendix at B-496 (affidavit of Phyllis Jones), B-509 
(affidavit of Janice Jaskey Butvin), B-525 (affidavit of Arlene 
Vans), B-538 (affidavit of Sandra Jaskey Hujarski)). One 
additional affidavit states "for years my daughters and I 
had been suffering from numerous health problems for 
which our doctors had been unable to find a cause." 
(Appendix at B-499 (affidavit of Mary Schaffer 11). These 
affidavits, which at most indicate that only seven of the 
plaintiffs even went to see a physician about their medical 
problems,12 constitute the only evidence offered by the 
plaintiffs of efforts they took to determine the cause of their 
injuries. However, this vague evidence does not indicate 
when these seven plaintiffs first made attempts to see 
physicians or what other efforts they made to determine the 
cause of their injuries in a timely manner. 
 
Accordingly, with regard to twenty of the twenty-one 
plaintiffs, the bankruptcy court's finding that these 
plaintiffs failed to diligently investigate the cause of their 
injuries is not clearly erroneous. Its holding that these 
plaintiffs' claims were discharged by the 1990 confirmation 




We note, however, that one of the plaintiffs, Ivan 
Schaffer, was not born until August 27, 1992, more than 
two years after the bankruptcy court confirmed 
Chemetron's plan of reorganization. We believe his situation 
merits separate discussion. 
 
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, "the 
confirmation of a plan . . . discharges the debtor from any 
debt that arose before the date of such confirmation." 11 
U.S.C. S 1141(d)(1)(A). Thus, in most circumstances, 
"confirmation of the debtor's reorganization plan discharges 
all prior claims against the debtor." Chemetron I, 72 F.3d at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Mary Schaffer's daughters are Amanda and Stephanie Schaffer, both 
plaintiffs to this action. 
 
12. These are Phyllis Jones, Janice Jaskey Butvin, Arlene Vans, Sandra 
Jaskey Hujarski, Mary Schaffer, Amanda Schaffer and Stephanie 
Schaffer. 
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346.13 However, if a potential claimant lacks sufficient 
notice of a bankruptcy proceeding, due process 
considerations dictate that his or her claim cannot be 
discharged by a confirmation order. In re Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 96 F.3d 687, 689-90 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Chemetron I, 72 F.3d at 346; In re Harbor Tank Storage Co., 
385 F.2d 111, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1967). 
 
Such due process considerations are often addressed by 
the appointment of a representative to receive notice for 
and represent the interests of a group of unknown 
creditors. See, e.g., Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 
559, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1966); In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 168 
B.R. 434, 436, 440 & n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff 'd, 58 F.3d 
1573 (11th Cir. 1995). In In re Amatex, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d 
Cir. 1985), this court held that a representative could be 
appointed to represent the interests of future unknown 
asbestos claimants in bankruptcy reorganization 
proceedings because such claimants are "sufficiently 
affected by the reorganization proceedings" as to require 
some voice in them and therefore qualify as "parties in 
interest" under 11 U.S.C. S 1109(b). Id. at 1041-43. Accord 
In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1986); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 46 B.R. 671, 675 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 
743, 747-49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). The Amatex  court did 
not decide whether future claimants are "creditors" who 
possess "claims" that may be discharged by a bankruptcy 
confirmation order. Id. at 1043. We need not reach this 
issue, however, because in the instant case there exists a 
more fundamental problem. Ivan Schaffer cannot be 
deemed to have received adequate notice of Chemetron's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. See also Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Estate of 
Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1576, 1577 (11th Cir. 1995); In re 
Christopher, 28 F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Waterman S.S. Corp., 
157 B.R. 220, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re The Charter Co., 113 B.R. 725, 
728 (M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 216 B.R. 611, 615 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997); In re Nevada Emergency Servs., Inc., 39 B.R. 
859, 861, 862 n.4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1984). 
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Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, because no effort was 
made to address his potential claims in that proceeding.14 
 
Where no action is taken to address the interests of 
unborn future claimants in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
reorganization proceeding, the reorganized former debtor 
cannot later avoid liability to such claimants by arguing 
that their claims were discharged in bankruptcy. Under 
fundamental notions of procedural due process, a claimant 
who has no appropriate notice of a bankruptcy 
reorganization cannot have his claim extinguished in a 
settlement pursuant thereto. See, e.g. , Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-19 (1950); 
Chemetron I, 72 F.3d at 346; In re Savage Indus., Inc., 43 
F.3d 714, 721 (1st Cir. 1994). Here, Ivan Schaffer had no 
notice of or participation in the Chemetron reorganization 
plan. No effort was made during the course of the 
bankruptcy proceeding to have a representative appointed 
to receive notice for and represent the interests of future 
claimants. Therefore, whatever claim Ivan Schaffer may 
now have was not subject to the bankruptcy court's bar 
date order, Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90, 97 (3d 
Cir. 1989), and was not discharged by that court's 
confirmation order. 
 
Chemetron contends that as a future claimant, Ivan 
Schaffer had sufficient notice of the bankruptcy proceeding 
because his mother, also a plaintiff to this action, had 
notice of the proceeding and was qualified to act as 
guardian for her unborn children. Although we do not 
dispute that a parent can represent the interests of her 
minor children, because of the imponderables involved, we 
do not believe the law imposes a duty upon a parent to take 
action to protect a potential claim of a child not yet 
conceived or born. Nor do we believe that in a Chapter 11 
reorganization, a bankruptcy court is obligated sua sponte 
to appoint a representative to deal with future interests if 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In Chemetron I, we held that the plaintiffs had received sufficient 
notice of the bankruptcy proceedings. However, it is apparent from the 
face of that decision that this court did not consider the specific 
question 
of whether sufficient notice was provided to unborn future claimant Ivan 
Schaffer. Therefore, that decision does not bind us as to this issue. 
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no request is made. See Locks v. United States Trustee, 157 
B.R. 89, 95-99 (W.D. Pa. 1993); cf. In re Chicago, Rock 
Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 788 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(holding the Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) does not impose on federal 
courts duty to appoint guardians for all potential litigants 
who cannot represent themselves).15 Such a duty would 
impose an enormous and unreasonable responsibility of 
prescience on the courts. Accordingly, we hold that the 
potential claim of an unborn child not represented in 
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings is not discharged by 






For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be affirmed except as to plaintiff Ivan Schaffer. As 
to Ivan Schaffer, the May 18, 1999 order of the district 
court will be reversed and the case remanded with 
instructions to direct the bankruptcy court to issue a 
declaration that his potential claim was not discharged by 
the July 12, 1990 confirmation order. Each side to bear its 
own costs. 
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15. We do not address whether such appointment is mandatory in 
bankruptcy liquidation proceedings. Compare Forty-Eight Insulations, 58 
B.R. at 477 (appointing futures representative in liquidation proceeding 
because after debtor-entity dissolves, future claimants will have no 
recourse) with Locks, 157 B.R. at 96 (appointment of futures 
representative in liquidation proceeding unnecessary). 
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